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BARRING THE GATES: TIMING AND 
TAILORING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING 
AND GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION 
AFTER CORRI v. EPA 
Charles Riordan* 
Abstract: In 2007, the Supreme Court affirmed the EPA’s ability to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. Designing a regu-
latory scheme for GHGs, however, is difficult. Carbon dioxide, a ubiqui-
tous GHG, is a byproduct of almost every industry in America, and 
regulating it places a heavy burden on emitters and administrators alike. 
The EPA sought to alleviate this burden by promulgating two new rules, 
the Timing and Tailoring Rules, designed to phase in regulation over a 
period of years. States and industry groups recently challenged these 
rules in the D.C. Circuit court in the case Coalition for Responsible Regula-
tion, Inc. v. EPA, but could not show the type of concrete injury necessary 
for Article III standing. This ostensible victory for environmental advo-
cates contains a sting in the tail: The court’s narrow construction of 
standing will hinder future challenges to GHG regulation, including 
those intended to spur greater action. 
Introduction 
 Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 1970 as the theory 
of global climate change began to develop.1 Since that time, global 
temperatures have risen with noticeable effects.2 The vast majority of 
climate scientists now believe that human activity is the most likely 
cause of climate change,3 but a coordinated response has been difficult 
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 & n.8 (2007). The first computerized 
Global Climate Model combining atmospheric and oceanic systems was created in 1969. 
See Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the 
Politics of Global Warming 155 (2010). 
2 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Syn-
thesis Report 30–33 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/ 
syr/ar4_syr.pdf. Eleven of the twelve years from 1995 to 2006 ranked among the twelve 
warmest years since 1850. Id. at 30. 
3 See William R.L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility in Climate Change, 107 Proc. of the 
Nat’l Acad. of Sci. of the U.S. of Am. 12,107, 12,107 (2010), available at http://pnas.org/ 
content/107/27/12107.full.pdf+html. 
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to achieve.4 In the United States, state and local initiatives to curb 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions have taken root,5 but there has 
been little concrete action at the federal level.6 
 In the absence of concrete GHG initiatives from Congress or the 
Executive Branch, many environmental advocacy groups have turned 
their attention to the CAA.7 This strategy bore fruit in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, a 2007 case where the Supreme Court held that the EPA had au-
thority to regulate motor vehicle GHG emissions under the CAA.8 
Commentators called the ruling a major victory for environmental activ-
ists.9 But Massachusetts v. EPA only held that the EPA could regulate 
GHGs under the CAA—whether and how regulations would be imple-
                                                                                                                      
4 See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present 
to Liberate the Future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153, 1157 (2009) (“Climate change legislation is 
peculiarly vulnerable to being unraveled over time for a variety of reasons.”); David G. 
Victor, Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests and Insti-
tutions, Global Envtl. Pol., Aug. 2006, at 90, 91 (detailing problems with the Kyoto Pro-
tocol). The Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement signed in 1997, set binding targets 
for industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 2008 to 2012. See 
Chris Wold et al., Climate Change and the Law 205–06 (2009). The reporting period 
ended in 2012, and the 2011 Durban Conference postponed adoption of a new protocol, 
possibly until 2015. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, Held in Dur-
ban from 28 November to 11 December 2011 Addendum Part Two, at 2 (2011), avail-
able at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf#page=2. 
5 See, e.g., Mass. Exec. Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, Massachusetts Clean 
Energy and Climate Plan for 2020, at ES-1 (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
eea/docs/eea/energy/2020-clean-energy-plan.pdf; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: 
Memorandum of Understanding 2 (Dec. 20, 2005), avialable at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ 
mou_final_12_20_05.pdf. 
6 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Diveregent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate 
Change, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 509 (2007) (“In terms of legal mandates, the U.S. gov-
ernment has done close to nothing to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases.”); Carl 
Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate Bill in Senate, N.Y. 
Times, July 23, 2010, at A15. The 113 climate change related bills in the 112th Congress 
were almost exactly divided between supporting climate action and hindering it. See Climate 
Debate in Congress, Ctr. for Climate & Energy Solutions, http://www.c2es.org/federal/ 
congress (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
7 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 510 & n.15 (listing the environmental groups that 
petitioned for GHG regulation under the CAA); Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change and the 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 111, 112 (2007) (“[N]umerous health and environmental 
groups . . . asked the Supreme Court to hold that the Clean Air Act gives EPA the power to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
8 549 U.S. at 532. 
9 See Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing Shadow, 
2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111, 158 (“[T]his decision is a landmark victory for environmentalists.”); 
Richard Lazarus, A Breathtaking Result for Greens, Envtl. F., May–June 2007, at 12, available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rlazarus/docs/columns/ColumnMayJune07.pdf. 
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mented remained an open question.10 When the EPA attempted to 
promulgate detailed regulations in 2009, industry groups and certain 
affected states challenged them in the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia.11 
 In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, petitioners argued 
that the CAA was ill-suited for regulating GHGs.12 They claimed that 
regulation of GHGs under the CAA did not reflect Congressional in-
tent,13 and would lead to an enormous and burdensome expansion of 
government power.14 The EPA had attempted to mitigate this concern 
by phasing in regulation through two rules—the Timing and Tailoring 
Rules—designed to ease the threatened burden on affected industries 
and state administrators.15 Petitioners, however, characterized these 
rules as an impermissible “rewrite” of the CAA.16 The D.C. Circuit dis-
missed the challenges to these rules—not on the merits, but for lack of 
jurisdiction.17 
 This Comment argues that although the D.C. Circuit was correct 
in rejecting petitioners’ challenge to the Timing and Tailoring Rules, 
                                                                                                                      
10 See 549 U.S. at 535 (“We hold only that EPA must ground its reasons for action or 
inaction in the statute.”). 
11 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam). 
12 Joint Opening Brief of Non-State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors at 27–28, 
Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d 102 (No. 10-01073). 
13 Id. at 9, 27. 
14 Final Brief of State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenor at 7, Coal. for Responsible 
Regulation, 684 F.3d 102 (No. 10-01092), 2011 WL 5942206 at *7 (“‘[R]egulation of green-
house gases under any portion of the CAA could result in an unprecedented expansion of 
EPA authority that would . . . touch every household in the land.’”) (quoting former EPA 
administrator Stephen Johnson). 
15 Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Cov-
ered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 50, 51, 70, 71); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,514 ( June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, 70, 71). The EPA estimated that regulation of GHGs absent the two rules 
would require 1.4 billion additional work hours from permitting authorities, at a cost of 
roughly $64.5 billion, and would greatly increase the processing time for Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration and Title V permits. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,539–40. 
16 See Joint Opening Brief of Non-State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors, supra 
note 12, at 12–13, 27. The applicable sections of the CAA set emissions standards ranging 
from 100 to 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” for stationary sources. See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7475(a), 7479(1), 7602(j), 7661–7661a (2006). The Tailoring Rule would instead insti-
tute an emissions threshold for carbon dioxide of 100,000 tons per year. Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
31,516 (2006). 
17 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 113–14. 
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its reliance on standing analysis might forestall future challenges to 
GHG regulation—including challenges from environmentalists. It is 
unclear how the EPA plans to transition to a wider scope of regulation 
once the Timing and Tailoring Rules lapse.18 What is clear after Coali-
tion for Responsible Regulation is that citizens will now have less input in 
setting the course.19 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 In 1999, a consortium of private organizations petitioned the EPA 
to regulate GHGs under the CAA.20 Although the EPA had previously 
stated that GHGs were “air pollutants” under the statute,21 the agency 
denied the petition in 2003.22 The denial claimed that the EPA lacked 
authority to regulate GHGs, in part due to potential political and eco-
nomic repercussions.23 In Massachusetts v. EPA, decided in 2007, the 
Supreme Court stated that the EPA’s reasoning was “divorced from the 
statutory text,” and that the agency did have authority to regulate 
GHGs.24 As a result of Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency reversed course 
in 2009 and issued an Endangerment Finding for an aggregate of six 
GHGs, subjecting them to regulation under the CAA.25 
 Following this finding, the EPA, together with the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration, established national GHG emissions 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516; Joseph Mangino, EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule 8–10 (2010), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/apti/video/pdfs/tailoring.pdf. 
19 See infra notes 72–97 and accompanying text. Citizen groups will still be able to par-
ticipate in the notice and comment period of rulemaking. See Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
20 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 510. Petitioners included environmental groups 
such as Greenpeace USA, Friends of the Earth, the Green Party of Rhode Island, and the 
Oregon Environmental Council. Id. at 510 n.15. 
21 Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, Office of Gen. Counsel, EPA, to Carol 
Browner, Adm’r, EPA 5 (Apr. 10, 1998), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/ 
bpercival/casebook/documents/epaco2memo1.pdf. 
22 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 
52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
23 Id. at 52,925–28. 
24 549 U.S. at 532. 
25 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 
66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). The six greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), meth-
ane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and 
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). Id. at 66,497. 
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standards for motor vehicles, the Tailpipe Rule.26 The EPA then de-
termined that the Endangerment Finding also triggered regulation of 
stationary source GHG emissions under two sections of the CAA: Title 
V and the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program.27 
                                                                                                                     
 The triggering of stationary source regulation created a logistical 
problem for the EPA. The CAA sets a cap on stationary source emis-
sions of air pollutants.28 Since carbon dioxide (CO2) is an extremely 
common gas, its regulation would entail a huge administrative bur-
den—the EPA would have to issue millions of new permits.29 The EPA 
estimated that the additional workload for permitting authorities would 
total over 1.4 billion work hours, at a cost of more than $63 billion.30 
Potentially affected sources would include shopping malls, certain res-
taurants, and even office buildings.31 To alleviate this burden, the EPA 
in 2010 passed the Timing and Tailoring Rules: the former pushed 
back the effective date of stationary source regulation, and the latter set 
a higher emissions threshold for regulating CO2 than other pollutants 
under the CAA.32 
 Certain state courts had already pushed back against the idea of 
GHG regulation under the CAA after the Massachusetts v. EPA deci-
sion.33 Then, after the EPA released the Endangerment Finding and its 
 
 
26 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. §§ 531, 533, 536, 537, 538). 
27 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479(1), 7602(j), 7661–7661a (2006); Prevention of Sig-
nificant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 
31,553–54 ( June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, 70, 71); Requirements for Prep-
aration, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,711 
(Aug. 7, 1980). 
28 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479(1), 7602(j), 7661–7661(a). 
29 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,562. 
30 See id. at 31,539. 
31 See George F. Allen & Marlo Lewis, Finding the Proper Forum for Regulation of U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Legal and Economic Implications of Massachusetts v. EPA, 44 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 919, 923–24 (2010). 
32 Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Cov-
ered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 50, 51, 70, 71); see Prevention of Significant Deterioration and 
Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
33 See, e.g., Longleaf Energy Assocs., LLC v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc., 681 
S.E.2d 203, 207 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that state regulation of GHGs was not re-
quired where EPA had not issued final rules, would be unprecedented, and would cause 
economic hardship); see also Appalachian Voices v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 693 
S.E.2d 295, 299–301 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that CO2 is not necessarily an “air pol-
lutant” under the CAA prior to an endangerment finding); Powder River Basin Res. Coun-
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corresponding regulations, a group of states, who were later joined by 
numerous industry trade associations, filed petitions for review of each 
EPA decision in the D.C. Circuit Court.34 The D.C. Circuit ultimately 
consolidated these petitions for review into a single appeal, Coalition for 
Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA.35 
 Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the EPA had abused its discre-
tion in crafting the 2010 Timing and Tailoring Rules, which modified 
explicit numerical targets in the CAA.36 The EPA countered that the 
Rules did not cause petitioners any harm—indeed, industry would face 
greater regulation without the Rules—and thus petitioners had no 
standing to challenge the Rules.37 State petitioners then used the EPA’s 
premise to craft a new standing claim—if the Rules reduced regulation, 
then the result would be higher statewide GHG emissions, which would 
provide the harm necessary for standing just as in Massachusetts v. 
EPA.38 The court rejected petitioners’ standing arguments and dis-
missed the challenges to the Rules for lack of jurisdiction, leaving the 
EPA free to regulate GHGs according to its own timetable.39 
II. Legal Background 
 Standing in federal courts is limited by Article III of the Constitu-
tion, which extends the judicial power to “cases” and “controversies.”40 
In the seminal case Massachusetts v. Mellon, in 1923, the Supreme Court 
relied on Article III to dismiss a state’s challenge of federal expendi-
tures as unconstitutional.41 In Mellon, Massachusetts attempted to bring 
a suit on behalf of its citizens as parens patriae, or “father of the country,” 
                                                                                                                      
cil v. Wyo. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 226 P.3d 809, 826 (Wyo. 2010) (holding that permit was 
validly issued where CO2 regulation had not yet taken place). 
34 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 116. The D.C. Circuit has exclusive juris-
diction over national regulations promulgated under the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) 
(2006). 
35 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 116. 
36 Id. at 145; see Joint Opening Brief of Non-State Petitioners and Supporting Interve-
nors, supra note 12, at 27, 33–35. 
37 Brief for Respondents at 79–80, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d 102 (No. 10-
01073). 
38 Final Reply Brief of State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenor at 3–6, Coal. for Re-
sponsible Regulation, 684 F.3d 102 (No. 10-01073) [hereinafter State Reply Brief]. 
39 See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 146–48. 
40 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
41 262 U.S. 447, 479–80 (1923); See Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending: The Role 
of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2001) (“The rise of modern standing 
doctrine in American Constitutional Law can be traced with some precision to Justice 
Sutherland’s opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon.”). 
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against the federal government. The court, however, noted that the 
case involved only “abstract questions of political power,” rather than 
concrete harms, in part because the expenditures did not challenge 
any “quasi-sovereign” rights of the state.42 Since Massachusetts could 
not show a quasi-sovereign interest of its own, the Court held that it 
could not represent its citizens against the federal government.43 Later 
cases identified a state’s quasi-sovereign interests as related to its citi-
zens’ general well-being, but separate from their actual injuries.44 
 Nearly seventy years later, the Supreme Court articulated a sepa-
rate three-part test for constitutional standing in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife.45 Lujan cites Mellon in support of this new test, but does not 
explicitly speak to the question of state standing.46 The “Lujan test” in-
stead outlines the three plaintiffs that any plaintiff must prove to show 
Article III standing: injury, causation, and redressability.47 To show “in-
jury in fact,” the plaintiff must demonstrate that harm to the plaintiff is 
“concrete and particularized . . . and [] actual or imminent;” mere 
“conjectural” or “hypothetical” injury will not suffice.48 Causation re-
quires a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of.”49 For the element of redressability, “it must be likely, as op-
posed to merely speculative, that the injury will be ‘redressed by a 
favorable decision.’”50 
 It is unclear how Lujan’s constitutional standing elements should 
be reconciled with the state standing doctrine from Mellon and its 
progeny.51 The question for state litigants is whether a quasi-sovereign 
                                                                                                                      
 
42 Id. at 484–86. 
43 Id. at 484–85. 
44 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602, 607 
(1982); Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. Land 
Resources & Envtl. L. 273, 298–99 (2007). Quasi-sovereign interests have never been 
fully defined, but judges and scholars identify two general types: a state’s interest in pro-
tecting the physical or economic well-being of its citizens, and a state’s interest in ensuring 
that its residents receive the full benefits flowing from a federal system of law. Snapp, 458 
U.S. at 607; see Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary 
Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1701, 
1757–59 (2008); Wildermuth, supra, at 298–305. 
45 See 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
46 Id. at 573–74. 
47 See id. at 560–61. 
48 Id. at 560 (citation omitted). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 561 (citation omitted). 
51 See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 
293, 299 (2005) (theorizing that general standing limitations might not apply to a parens 
patriae suit); Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of 
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interest is itself sufficient for standing, or whether the Lujan test must 
be met regardless. The Supreme Court did not speak on the issue until 
2007, when deciding Massachusetts v. EPA.52 This case also questioned 
whether litigation related to climate change could satisfy the Lujan 
standing requirements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.53 
 In Massachusetts v. EPA, Massachusetts claimed that greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions contributed to rising sea levels and that the EPA’s 
refusal to regulate GHGs threatened state-owned coastal land.54 Massa-
chusetts pointed out that the EPA could achieve a 2.5 percent reduc-
tion of global GHG emissions simply by regulating motor vehicle emis-
sions.55 In a 5–4 split, the Court held that petitioners had standing to 
challenge the EPA’s decision not to regulate GHGs.56 
 The majority based its standing analysis in part on Massachusetts’ 
assertion of a quasi-sovereign interest—the health and well-being of its 
citizens.57 The majority also noted that Congress explicitly gave Massa-
chusetts a procedural right to appeal rejection of its rulemaking peti-
tion.58 Given these factors, the majority held that Massachusetts was 
owed “special solicitude” in standing analysis.59 
 Turning to constitutional standing elements, the majority held 
that (1) existing and potential damage to Massachusetts-owned coastal 
land via rising sea levels represented injury in fact; (2) the EPA’s refusal 
to regulate GHGs bore a causal connection to that injury; and (3) an 
Endangerment Finding for GHGs would result in promulgation of mo-
tor vehicle emissions standards that would help relieve the injury.60 The 
                                                                                                                      
Public Goods, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 814 (2009) (claiming that historical Supreme Court 
standing jurisprudence does not comfortably fit with injury in fact requirement). 
52 See 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“It is of considerable relevance that the party seeking 
review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual.”). 
53 Id. at 521–26. 
54 Id. at 522–23. 
55 Oral Argument at 10:20, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05–1120), available 
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1120. 
56 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 501, 526. 
57 Id. at 519–20. 
58 Id. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006)). In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts 
argued that § 7607(b)(1) is a general review statute that does not give States any special 
rights. See id. at 536–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The relevant statutory text reads: “A 
petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating . . . any standard under 
section 7521 of this title. . . may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia.” § 7607(b)(1). 
59 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520. Since the Court found Massachusetts had 
standing, it considered the petition without the need to determine standing for any other 
party. Id. at 518. 
60 Id. at 521–26. 
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majority pointed out that it was the EPA’s “steadfast refusal to regulate” 
that related to the threatened harm, and placed weight on the fact that 
unregulated motor vehicle emissions made a “meaningful contribution” 
to GHG concentrations.61 
 Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, criticized the majority’s charac-
terization of sea-level rise as “imminent,” and disputed the findings of 
injury, causation, and redressability.62 In addition, the dissent claimed 
that a parens patriae suit requires the showing of a quasi-sovereign inter-
est in addition to constitutional standing requirements, making the case 
for standing “harder, not easier.”63 Finally, the dissent cited prior cases, 
including Massachusetts v. Mellon, for the proposition that states cannot 
sue the federal government in a parens patriae action.64 
 Massachusetts v. EPA did not directly state how much deference 
should be given to sovereign states in standing analysis, leaving lower 
courts with little guidance.65 D.C. Circuit cases following Massachusetts v. 
EPA have tended to read its standing analysis narrowly, with respect to 
both “special solicitude” for states and the Lujan factors for climate 
change cases.66 In Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of the 
Interior, three non-profit associations and a federally recognized tribal 
government challenged a federal oil and gas leasing program, partly on 
grounds that it would contribute to climate change.67 In 2009, the D.C. 
Circuit ruled that petitioners did not have standing to challenge the 
program on substantive climate change grounds.68 The tribal govern-
ment could not show actual harm to its territory, and thus was not enti-
tled to “special solicitude.”69 The court also reiterated the general 
                                                                                                                      
 
64 Id. at 521, 525 (emphasis added). 
62 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 540–46 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 538. 
64 Id. at 539 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. 610 n.16, Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485–86). 
65 See Mank, supra note 44, at 1746; Weinstock, supra note 50. 
66 See North Carolina v. EPA, 587 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that states 
must show Article III standing even if owed special solicitude); Ctr. for Biological Diversity 
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reasoning that “outside of 
the very limited factual setting of Massachusetts, . . . [Lujan] sets forth the test for stand-
ing.”); Del. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 
F.3d 575, 579 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that special solicitude does not obviate the 
need to show concrete injury); see also WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 880 F. Supp. 2d 77, 
84–86 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting summary judgment to defendant in climate change action 
for lack of jurisdiction). 
67 563 F.3d at 471–72. 
68 Id. at 475–79. The court granted standing on an alternative procedural argument. 
Id. at 479. 
69 Id. at 477. The D.C. Circuit has consistently refused to grant standing to states with-
out a showing of injury. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 148 
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rule—derived from Massachusetts v. Mellon and highlighted in Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’ dissent to Massachusetts v. EPA—that states cannot bring 
suits on behalf of their citizens to challenge the operation of federal 
laws.70 Turning to the constitutional elements of standing, the court 
found that petitioners could show neither injury in fact nor causa-
tion.71 In particular, the causal chain between the leasing program and 
climate-change-related injuries to natural habitat was too speculative to 
support standing—an argument very similar to Chief Justice Roberts’ 
dissent, and one which has cropped up in a subsequent D.C. District 
Court case, WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar.72 
III. Analysis 
 In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit 
found that the petitioners did not have standing to challenge the Tim-
ing and Tailoring Rules (the “Rules”).73 The Rules did not injure peti-
tioners, but instead mitigated their regulatory burden.74 Vacating the 
Rules would result in “astronomical costs” and would “unleash chaos,” 
actually increasing petitioners’ injuries.75 Absent a showing of injury in 
fact or redressability, petitioners could not meet the “irreducible consti-
tutional [] elements of standing.”76 
                                                                                                                      
 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that state petitioners must show concrete and par-
ticularized injury in fact); Del. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, 558 F.3d at 579 n.6. 
70 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 477; see supra notes 41–43, 63 and accompany-
ing text. 
71 Id. at 478. 
72 Id. at 478–79; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 542–45 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); 
880 F. Supp. 2d at 85–86. 
73 See 684 F.3d 102, 113–14, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The court also denied 
petitioners’ challenges to the Endangerment Finding, Tailpipe Rule, and “triggering” in-
terpretation for stationary source regulation. Id. at 113–14. The Endangerment Finding 
was consistent with the statutory text and supported by the record. Id. at 117. The EPA was 
not required to assess regulatory costs when implementing the Tailpipe Rule because of 
the clear statutory command to regulate upon an endangerment finding. Id. at 126. Fi-
nally, the plain text of the statute invalidated petitioners’ various interpretations of the 
Clean Air Act “triggering” effect. Id. at 136. 
74 Id. at 146. 
75 Id. at 146–47. For quantification of these costs, see id. at 144; Prevention of Signifi-
cant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 
31,539–40 ( June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, 70, 71). 
76 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 146 (quotations omitted). The court also 
rejected petitioners’ argument that Congress would redress any excessive regulatory bur-
den by enacting corrective legislation. Id. at 147 (“State Petitioners’ faith that Congress will 
alleviate their injury is inherently speculative.”) Congress debated whether to set legislative 
limits on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in 2009 and 2010, but a proposed bill failed in 
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 The court also rejected the idea that a state afflicted with high 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions would automatically be granted 
standing after Massachusetts v. EPA.77 Crucial to that previous case was 
Massachusetts’ showing of damage to its coastal land, which in the ma-
jority’s view satisfied the constitutional standing requirement of injury 
in fact.78 State petitioners in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, by con-
trast, offered only a generalized claim that they might suffer “injuries 
allegedly caused by increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere” absent strict regulation.79 The D.C. Circuit held that 
states were not exempt from showing the constitutional standing ele-
ment of injury in fact, and found that petitioners had failed to meet 
their burden of proof.80 
 As seen in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of the Inte-
rior and other cases, the D.C. Circuit has consistently emphasized the 
narrow focus of Massachusetts v. EPA’s standing analysis.81 In essence, 
D.C. Circuit precedent provides that all challenges to future GHG regu-
lations—even from states with special solicitude—will have to meet the 
constitutional standing elements of injury in fact, causation, and re-
dressability.82 Now that regulations for GHG emissions exist, however, 
demonstrating these elements will be difficult.83 
 The Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, the recent high-
water point for standing, when GHGs were completely unregulated, 
                                                                                                                      
the Senate. Matthew L. Wald, Court Backs E.P.A. Over Emissions Limits Intended to Reduce 
Global Warming, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2012, at A13. 
77 See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 148. 
78 Id. (“These specific, factual submissions [of damage to Massachusetts’ coast] were 
key to the standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA.”). 
79 Final Reply Brief of State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenor, supra note 38, at 3–
4. 
80 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 148. 
81 North Carolina v. EPA, 587 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Ctr. for Biological Diversity 
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Del. Dep’t of Natural Res. & 
Envtl. Control v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d 575, 579 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
82 See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 146, 148 (holding that Massachusetts v. 
EPA does not exempt states from showing injury in fact); North Carolina v. EPA, 587 F.3d at 
426 (noting petitioners acknowledged that even “special solicitude” would not obviate the 
need to demonstrate Article III standing). 
83 The analysis below applies even in the event that petitioner could demonstrate a 
“procedural right” to review as in Massachusetts v. EPA. See 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). In the 
D.C. Circuit, a procedural right relaxes the Article III requirement of redressability, but 
not injury in fact or causation. See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 
1157 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 880 F. Supp. 2d 77, 82–86 
(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Ctr. for Law & Educ., 396 F.3d at 1157) (dismissing challenge based 
on climate-change impacts and refusing to relax standing elements based on procedural 
rights analysis). 
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which factored into the holding that petitioners faced “actual” and 
“imminent” harm.84 Now that the D.C. Circuit has upheld regulation of 
GHGs, emissions will start to decrease, and it will be much more diffi-
cult for a future petitioner to demonstrate imminent injury from cli-
mate change.85 Imminent harm can be constructed narrowly: in Center 
for Biological Diversity, the court held that rising temperatures in the Ar-
tic—which is well supported by scientific evidence86—would not suffice 
to show imminent harm to an Alaskan village.87 Redressability will also 
be more difficult to prove—future petitioners must show that their re-
quest for greater GHG regulations would be achievable and would not 
simply lead to gridlock.88 
 Finally, causation may be the most difficult element to meet.89 The 
Massachusetts v. EPA Court held with respect to causation that unregulated 
motor vehicle emissions made a “meaningful contribution” to GHG 
concentrations, and hence to petitioners’ injuries.90 Partial regulation of 
                                                                                                                      
84 See 549 U.S. at 521 (“EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’”). 
85 The EPA estimates that its promulgated fuel efficiency standards will reduce GHG 
emissions by nearly six billion metric tons over the lifetime of regulated vehicles. See Hearing 
on EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gases, Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the H. Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (opening statement of Regina McCarthy, Assistant Ad-
ministrator for Air and Radiation, EPA), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/ 
sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/EP/20120629/HHRG-112-IF 
03-WState-McCarthyR-20120629.pdf. EPA also has set Best Available Control Technology 
standards large stationary source CO2 emitters, which will limit GHG emissions. Id. at 9; see 
Mangino, supra note 18 at 6–7 (noting that sources responsible for seventy percent of U.S. 
emissions will be regulated by 2012). 
86 See Temperature Change in Alaska, Alaska Climate Res. Ctr., http://climate.gi.alaska. 
edu/ClimTrends/Change/TempChange.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
87 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 478. 
88 See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 683 F.3d at 146–47 (noting that administrative agen-
cies would be overwhelmed by additional permitting request from lower emissions thresholds, 
leading to “chaos”); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tai-
loring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,517 ( June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, 70, 71) 
(claiming that regulation at the levels prescribed by the literal text of the CAA would result in 
gridlock). The problem of gridlock would be exacerbated by the fact that certain Title V per-
mits do not require lower emissions. See Clean Air Act Advisory Comm., Air Permitting 
Streamlining Techniques and Approaches for Greenhouse Gases 31 (2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/nsr/ghgdocs/20120914CAAACPermitStreamlining.pdf. 
89 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 478–79 (holding the causal chain between 
oil drilling and climate change effects was too tenuous to support standing); WildEarth 
Guardians, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 85–86 (dismissing challenge based on climate-change im-
pacts for inability to show causation and redressability). 
90 See 549 U.S. at 524–25 (“[R]educing domestic automobile emission is hardly a tenta-
tive step . . . . Judged by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful 
contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners, to 
global warming.”). 
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GHGs, at the very least, weakens the “causal connection” between the 
EPA’s actions and damage from global warming.91 The D.C. Circuit took 
a skeptical view of climate change causation in Center for Biological Diver-
sity, detailing the numerous steps required to show standing: 
In order to [show injury] . . . Petitioners must argue that: 
adoption of the Leasing Program will bring about drilling; 
drilling, in turn, will bring about more oil; this oil will be con-
sumed; the consumption of this oil will result in additional 
carbon dioxide being dispersed into the air; this carbon di-
oxide will consequently cause climate change; this climate 
change will adversely affect the animals [that petitioners 
were interested in observing] . . . therefore Petitioners are 
injured . . . .92 
The court found this causal chain too speculative to allow for standing 
under Article III.93 In 2012, the D.C. District Court rejected a similar 
challenge to a federal coal leasing program for lack of jurisdiction, 
again based on an inability to show causation between the program and 
environmental damage from climate change.94 Other courts have ap-
plied a similar analysis, even in cases involving state petitioners and 
special solicitude.95 
 Thus, after Coalition for Responsible Regulation, parties who wish to 
challenge the future pace of GHG regulation—including environ-
mental groups—will face major standing hurdles. This is a very real 
concern for environmentalists, given that the EPA will not regulate 
“small” stationary source emitters until 2016 at the earliest, leaving 
thirty percent of all stationary source emissions unregulated for at least 
the next three years.96 Those who wish to see increased regulation 
                                                                                                                      
 
91 In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, the court supported the EPA’s contention that 
new GHG emissions regulations would further the CAA’s environmental goals, See 684 F.3d 
at 128. Global GHG emissions might still increase despite these regulations, due to emis-
sions from foreign countries and non-regulated sources, but causation standing analysis 
does not apply to action of independent third parties. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479. 
92 563 F.3d at 478. 
93 Id. at 478–79. 
94 See WildEarth Guardians, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 85–86. 
95 See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxonmobile Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 881–82 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (dictum); see also Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 816 F. Supp. 2d 
1118, 1136 (D.N.M. 2011) (rejecting private petitioner’s causation argument linking cli-
mate change impacts and oil and gas lease sales on public land). 
96 See Mangino, supra note 18 at 7–10. “Small” sources are those that emit less than fif-
ty thousand tons of GHGs per year. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
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might try to challenge future EPA rules in federal court, but such law-
suits would face a serious risk of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.97 In 
practical terms, Coalition for Responsible Regulation is a double-edged 
sword: the court’s restrictive standing analysis averted a potentially 
strong challenge to GHG regulation under the Clean Air Act, but it 
could easily be used against environmentalists in the future.98 
Conclusion 
 In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals reaffirmed the EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emis-
sions. The court also gave the EPA discretion to tailor its regulation, in 
order to ease logistical difficulties caused by the express language of 
the Clean Air Act. This ruling allows the EPA to begin the first nation-
wide program of GHG regulation. Undoubtedly, this is a victory for en-
vironmentalists—but the victory is tempered by the court’s standing 
analysis, which bars the gates against future regulation-forcing suits. 
Citizens who wish to have a voice in future GHG regulation will have to 
pursue administrative channels, as the D.C. Circuit appears unreceptive 
to petitioners challenging the EPA directly. 
 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 ( June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, 70, 71). 
97 See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 148 (dismissing challenge to EPA rules 
for lack of jurisdiction); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 478 (dismissing sub-
stantive climate-change-related challenges to agency decision for lack of jurisdiction); 
North Carolina v. EPA, 587 F.3d at 429 (dismissing challenge to EPA rule for lack of jurisdic-
tion). 
98 See Seth Jaffe, Shocking News: The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is Not Going to Overturn 
Massachusetts v. EPA, Law & The Environment, Foley Hoag LLP (Feb 26, 2012), http:// 
www.lawandenvironment.com/2012/02/shocking-news-the-d-c-circuit-court-of-appeals-is-not- 
going-to-overturn-massachusetts-v-epa/ (noting the challenges to Timing and Tailoring Rules 
were stronger than petitioners’ other claims). 
